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Abstract:
When France made Tunisia a protectorate in 1881, they introduced language
policies that established French as the language of the public sphere and restricted Arabic to
religion and the home. Until Tunisian independence in 1956, French was officially the language
of social and economic mobility and even after the establishment of the republic French persisted
unofficially as the language of the public sphere. It maintained this role despite the establishment
of Arabic as the official language and the ultimately failed policies of Arabization. This study
will focus on code-switching in Tunisia, or the habitual switching between French and Arabic
that many citizens practice. Based on interviews with several Tunisian women who came of age
during the transition from the protectorate to the republic, this paper attempts to prove that
French and Arabic are politically charged languages that signify identity in Tunisia. The
research, however, indicates that the issue is too complicated to be explained with a single theory
that equates language and identity.

I. Introduction
The 16th century Spanish grammarian Antonio de Nebrija once said: “Language has
always been the companion of empire.” 1 Indeed, the French occupation of Tunisia demonstrated
the weapon-like role language can play. When the French established the Tunisian protectorate
in 1881 they set in motion a linguistic encounter that continues to shape social interactions in
Tunisia decades after independence. The question at present is to what extent this weapon of
empire retains its edge and to what extent it has been dulled and internalized into Tunisian
society. This paper will explore these ideas through an examination of current language habits in
Tunisia. Specifically, the paper will consider the phenomenon among Tunisian women of 60-70
years old of code-switching between French and (Tunisian) Arabic; it will explore whether
language choices in conversations are indicative of social identity. Code-switching refers to the
phenomenon of switching from one language to another in everyday life. 2 My research will
endeavor to support the thesis that code-switching between French and Arabic carries
implications for identity because of the politically charged characteristics of both languages. The
paper will attempt to prove the thesis in several steps. First, the introduction will establish the
basics of the language climate in Tunisia. Following that, the paper will outline relevant theories
about the connections between language and identity and consider their relevance to a Tunisian
case study. After the paper is grounded in theory, I will present my field work research. The
research involved observing Tunisian women’s language habits and interviewing them about
their perceptions of language and identity. The research will be analyzed based on the
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established theories. Lastly, the paper will make brief hypotheses about what this research could
imply about the future language situation in Tunisia and suggest further areas of study.
As the aforementioned agenda indicates, the research will take many forms. I will include
work published previously in academic journals by other authors, but there is a great need to test
these theories and, especially, to assess the extent to which one might apply them to Tunisia. The
work done in this project is largely historical in perspective and, thus, its immediate relevance
may not be wholly apparent. However, it may be that through studying the historical factors that
created certain language-identity associations that one can hypothesize about future language
dynamics. Specifically, this information could be used to assess the issues that might arise as
English gains more ground in both Tunisia and the globe; English now rivals French in
popularity as a teaching medium in higher education. 3 Globalization has replaced colonialism as
the avenue through which languages are spread. This research will hopefully provide some
grounding for such future studies.

The language situation in Tunisia
Situated in North Africa on the Mediterranean coast, Tunisia has seen its share of foreign
intruders. A possession that passed between Roman, Arab, Ottoman Turk and French hands,
Tunisia is an exceptional place to study the political and social influences of language. Moha
Ennaji writes: “One should not think…that all the inhabitants of the Maghreb are
multilingual…Speakers range from monolingual Berber or Dialectal Arabic speakers to those
who can use the two varieties of Arabic as well as one or two European languages in their
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everyday life for specific purposes.” 4 The language dynamics in the Maghreb and Tunisia in
particular are complex and deserve a closer examination. While the point of this paper is not to
examine how different languages came to exist in Tunisian society, it would be helpful to begin
the paper with a brief overview of these languages. One can then better understand the
circumstances that were at work during the French protectorate and after 1956 independence.
When setting the stage for Arabic-French code-switching, it is logical to first focus on
Arabic, the language that established itself in Tunisia long before French. However, one must
differentiate between the categories of Arabic. First, there is Classical Arabic, a codified
language that is irrevocably associated with Islam. It is a sacred language used in prayer and the
Koran but few have a fluent grasp of it because of its high level of difficulty. 5 Nevertheless, it is
the official language of Arab states, including Tunisia. Efforts have been made to popularize
Arabic through a new form, Modern Standard Arabic. Also a written language, Modern Standard
is associated with Arabization and the attempt to spread a sense of universal culture in the Arab
world. Its original aim in the Maghreb was to replace French as a medium of expressing
modernity. 6 It is seen today as easier and as more useful than Classical Arabic but is learned in
school and is no one’s mother tongue. 7 Finally, there is dialectal Arabic, which is unique to each
Arab country and is spoken at home as the mother tongue. It is not a written language, and is
seen as the language of the street and home, rather than the language of education, modernity or
public life. The 1975 International Conference on Arabization urged governments to stop the use
of dialect in art, and today the language has little substantial government support. Dialect,
however, is less stigmatized in Tunisia than elsewhere in the Maghreb. The first president of the
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republic, Habib Bourguiba, used dialectal Arabic in many speeches and recognized its
importance for effective communication with the population. 8 One reason behind the relative
lack of stigmatism may be because of Tunisia’s relatively small Berber population. While Berber
is the mother tongue of 40 percent of Moroccans and 25 percent of Algerians, it is the mother
tongue of just one percent of Tunisians. 9 Subsequently, Morocco and Algeria might place greater
prestige on the “higher” forms of Arabic because of their association with Arab cultural
preeminence. Unless otherwise indicated, when this paper refers to the Arabic used between the
speakers in conversations the assumption will be that it is Tunisian dialect.
Dialectal Arabic in Tunisia, as in the entire Maghreb, is heavily influence by French and
a significant portion of the vocabulary is directly borrowed or adapted from French. Nonetheless,
French holds its own status in the language field. It is still popular despite Arabization policies;
French media still outsells Arabic media in Tunisia. Similar to how French influences Tunisian
dialect, French in Tunisia also borrows from Arabic. 10 It is the mutual borrowing characterizing
the two principal languages of Tunisia that is the first indication that the country is rich ground
for studying code-switching. Now that the language setting is clearer, the paper will examine the
connections between identity and language and the politics of language policies.

II. Language and Identity
This section will make clear the main ideas behind this paper’s supposition that codeswitching habits are indicative of perceptions of self identity by presenting the theoretical
foundations of the research. First, the ideological undertones of language will be explored,
including the ability of language to create group identity. Next, the paper will expand on the
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connection between politics and language by examining the nature of language planning.
Specific references will be made to Tunisia’s language policies as a French protectorate and as
an independent republic. This information will provide the necessary context to analyze my field
work observations.

Language as a basis of group dynamics
Characterizing the 75-year period of French control in Tunisia as a period of political
dominance would be a too limited description. The creation of the French protectorate ushered in
a new era in which language became not just a medium of communication, but a declaration of
social and political identity. The inundation of French into a society that had previously been 100
percent Arabic-speaking put into sharp relief the connotations attached to speaking a language. 11
In order to assess the specific case of Tunisia, however, it is first necessary to look at the general
theories about the correlation between language and identity. A multilingual situation such as
that in Tunisia creates a hyperconsciousness in speakers, in which one thinks about the language
in which one speaks more than one would in a monolingual society. 12 The colonial encounter in
particular highlights the ideologies that underlie languages. 13 This ideology includes “the
cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of
moral and political interests.” 14 An event like the arrival of the French in Tunisia, an event in
which two different communities come into contact, may lead to reconfigurations and
reassessments of speech patterns that reflect changes in social ideologies. In one scenario,
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borrowing words from the newly encountered language and integrating them into one’s existing
language may indicate a high regard for the donor language. This encounter also has the potential
to serve as an impetus to delineate a language for the community that the donor language has
occupied. 15 In the latter situation, speaking a language is a way of declaring a belonging to a
specific, closed group whereas the former situation might indicate a greater openness. These
groups are not necessarily bound by borders; they are instead imagined nations based around
linguistic homogeneity. 16 The contrasting scenarios mentioned demonstrate that the association
of languages with community identities has the equal potential to be either a sign of
estrangement or one of acculturation. 17
Switching between languages and keeping group associations separate, rather than
incorporating words from a donor language into one’s existing language, is more likely to occur
when politicization of identity is paramount. 18 Deeply-rooted cultural and personal attitudes,
including perceptions of modernity and openness, affect speaking habits. 19 Switching between
languages, however, can be psychologically taxing. The speaker may feel frustrated about her
command of the languages, but she may also be affected by the possible switching of identities.20
When one language community begins to integrate a new language into their vernacular, they
still might attempt to create a semblance of homogeneity and use what lexical and grammatical
resources they have to create, in greetings and other formulaic ways, their sense of belonging
together.” 21 This process may, in fact, lead to the development of new language patterns. Bonnie
Uriciuoli uses the terms “matrix language” to describe one’s mother tongue, and “embedded
15
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language” to describe the language that is introduced and incorporated into one’s habits. 22 Which
language is which differs on the basis of social factors like economics. The embedding of
cultural identity through language demonstrates that identity has become de-territorialized; it is
no longer always associated with a specific area of the world, but with certain ideologies.
Boundaries remain in other aspects. Those in power may develop speaking habits that enclose
them in an elite group, including switching completely from the common language of the
community to the imported one. 23 This phenomenon creates boundaries on identity, assigning
specific social identity characteristics to linguistic groups. Those excluded from the elite group
may also react, and feel more compelled to use language as a unifying factor within their own
group and solidify their identity in opposition to the elites.

The Politics of Language Planning
In many cases the members of the aforementioned elite class and the government
officials overlap. These are the people with the power to assign roles to language. They may be
guided by their equation of language and national identity, although their personal histories
certainly influence their perceptions of what constitutes national identity. 24 It may be difficult to
directly regulate what language(s) parents pass on to their children as mother tongues, but
language planning choices still influence the population at large because of their far reach.
Political decisions are made about the languages used in government and education. 25 Language
planning sends a message about which languages will be tolerated, and sets up a linguistic
hierarchy. Postcolonial states, particularly, tend to organize their societies around projects that
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relate cultural identity to economic and political development and this association is apparent in
language planning. 26 There is in this situation the assumption that language equals culture.
Whether or not this assumption is inherently true is less important than the fact that the
perpetuation of such an assumption through language planning may make it the reality in the
citizens’ minds. As the top-down language planning changes over time, so do perceptions of self
and use of language. The next two segments of this paper will demonstrate the potential
motivations and effects of these shifts through a look at Tunisia as a French protectorate and as
an independent state. Together these political histories set the stage for looking at the
motivations and implications of code-switching in Tunisia.

A. The French protectorate: 1881-1956
The 1881 establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia marked France’s second
occupation in the Maghreb; Algeria had been colonized in 1830 and Morocco would later
become a protectorate in 1912. The French approach to colonialism was unique and lends itself
particularly well to an examination of language and identity. The British colonial missions
implemented language policies that stressed the separateness of the European and African
identities by not encouraging linguistic assimilation. The French took a different approach and
sought to establish a more universal identity to which a limited number of African elites could
belong once they learned the French language and the ideology that accompanied it. 27 Taking
power in Tunisia was a “mission civilisatrice” for the French. 28 Whereas the British focused
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chiefly on economic exploitation, the French goals were largely cultural in nature. 29 The notion
of cultural superiority, as evidenced through the high status they gave their language over
Arabic, was seen as a justification of colonialism. 30 The French classified Arabic (both classical
and dialectal) as a lesser language and thus classified its speakers as belonging to an inferior
society and backwards ways of life. The strong social connotations of French and its presentation
as a superior language explain “the somewhat stronger language loyalty among francophone
Africans than among their Anglophone counterparts…the status of English in post independence
Africa does not carry the same emotional weight as do issues involving the status of French.” 31
It has been established here that the French sought to infiltrate Tunisia through language,
but the issue at hand now is how this goal was accomplished. How did French shift from being
the language of the conqueror to being integrated into everyday speech and interaction? The
colonial administration’s language planning exemplifies the manner in which language and
ideology can be conflated and perpetuated. The choice of language had not only ideological
motivations, based on the superior perception of French language and society, but it also had
practical consequences. 32 The French implemented their language as the language of
government, business and secular education, a decision which put the Tunisian subjects under
French control. 33 The administration forced Arabic speakers to acquire an adequate command of
French by making it the only language of social mobility. Advancement politically or
economically required speaking French. One of the ramifications of this policy was that French
became associated with modernity and economic advancement, an association that reinforced the
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French justification of the protectorate. Second, the policy relegated French and Arabic to
different social domains; French took over the official and public spheres, except for the mosque,
while Arabic (regardless of style) was narrowed to the home and religion.
The establishment of the French protectorate in Tunisia exemplifies how a government’s
language planning shapes the role of languages in a society and instills the ideology attached to
them. The ideological and political objectives of the French bureaucracy would in fact have farreaching implications and lasting effects on the roles of language in Tunisia. The language
policies after 1956 will be discussed now with the intention of further explaining how the
phenomenon of code-switching took root in Tunisia.

B. Independent Tunisia: 1956-present
When the French protectorate ended in 1956 the only viable education system was in
French; a system that used Arabic as the medium of teaching, even in the lower grades, was not
to be found. 34 Perhaps surprisingly, after Habib Bourguiba became the first president of the
independent state in 1956, linguistic and cultural ties to France continued to dominate the Arabic
language. Initially he had favored Arabization – or the elevation of Arabic to the status of the
sole language of the government and the sole language of instruction in education – despite the
fact that he and the other members of the political elite received French educations. Soon,
however, he publicly favored French language and culture and pressed for the expansion of the
Francophonie, the organization of French-speaking nations. 35 Bourguiba hoped to create a
modernized state and, in doing so, tied modernization with the French language. French was
given a privileged place in the education system with the intention of facilitating the creation of
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the nation’s future modern public figures. 36 The Tunisian republic stressed its biculturalism and
its ties to the West through language and indelibly associated French with modernity and
progress. In this sociopolitical context, Arabic had little choice but to default to the language of
tradition; it was to be consigned to the private sphere. Bourguiba thus created a climate which
encouraged bilingualism, but also a greater consciousness of what language one speaks and
when.
In light of Bourguiba’s language planning, the question arises: why was Arabization
deemphasized? Arabization seemed to be the direction of choice among the newly independent
Maghreb in the 1960s, including reform in Algeria after its 1962 independence. The process was
meant to remedy the effects of a 75-year lack of public discourse in Arabic in Tunisia and to
produce “an Arabic modernity as well as an integral national linguistic space of cultural
authenticity.” 37 Like French, Arabic vied for the position of a modernizing language. Unlike
Morocco and Algeria, states which have large Berber populations, Tunisia’s population is nearly
100 percent native-Arabic-speaking. 38 Hypothetically, Arabization should thus have found its
firmest ground in Tunisia. In reality the country remains more francophone than Morocco or
Algeria. Although Bourguiba followed the other leaders and imposed Arabic as the official
language, French was too deeply ingrained in government and education to be rapidly replaced
on a widespread scale by Arabic. 39
Post independence Tunisia initially presented the continued use of French in public life as
an interim strategy, a bridge between the colonial language planning and the widespread
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establishment of Arabic as the national language. 40 It could be argued that French cultural
influences were also left standing for the time being as Tunisia sought to establish its own
identity. Yet over time complete Arabization fell short. The infrastructure was simply not there.
The lack of Arabic infrastructure in the public sphere meant a continued, uncontested association
of French with modernity and stunted Arabization in Tunisia. The members of the government
were nearly all French-educated and most Tunisians lived close to the most francophone areas of
the country, the coasts where the French had settled. Tunisian literacy rates in Arabic and French
at this time were roughly equal. 41 Furthermore, Arabization never became the politically charged
issue that it was in neighboring Algeria. Several factors may be responsible for the lack of
language polarization. First, the French colonized Algeria whereas they made Tunisia a
protectorate, indicating a much more pervasive control of everyday Algerian life, the resentment
of which was evidenced by the 7-year bloody war for independence. 42 Additionally, Algeria had
to contend with a large Berber language fighting for their language rights and thus had more
contested identities to manage and appease. Tunisia, alternately, had only to negotiate the path
between Arabic and French, languages which had already been established as belonging to
separate areas of life. The Tunisian leadership saw no conflict between the path of modernization
enabled by French and the traditional societal values ingrained in Arabic. 43 Under the second
president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, French continues to be the language of social mobility and
the number of students learning the language has even increased since 1956. 44 While humanities
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studies have gradually been arabized at the secondary school level, French remains the language
of instruction for science and technical subjects, especially at the level of higher education. 45
Considering that language is a medium through which one identifies with a community,
the language planning of the Tunisian government indicates a desire to be at once both
francophone and Arab. It is because of this apparent split-personality of society that Tunisia
makes an excellent case study for the effects of code-switching on identity. The field work for
this study will now delve further into the motivations behind switching between Arabic and
French and will look closer at the extent to which language is indicative of personal identity.

III. Framing the Study
Criteria for choosing research subjects
The field study research was designed to test the theoretical connections between
language and identity. I selected subjects who code-switch regularly between French and Arabic
because the deeply ingrained bilingualism reflects a diverse political past in Tunisia that has
shaped identity on both the state and citizen level. Interviewing monolingual subjects would be
inappropriate for this study; such a course would not illustrate to the desired extent the
ramifications of competing political identities for the speaker’s identity. It is the existence of this
competition, the result of two different cultural encounters in the late 19th and 20th centuries,
which enables observations of calculated choice of language. The subjects of this research also
fit other criteria. To begin with, they are women. This choice was made for two reasons, the first
of which is practicality. As a female researcher I would have been constrained by social norms
had I tried to seek out men to interview. Because I live with only a host mother, it is more
realistic for me to use her and her closest friends, who are all female. The second reason for
45
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choosing to study Tunisian women is more political. One of the hallmarks of Bourguiba’s reform
after independence was the improved status of women and greater emphasis on their education. 46
These reforms are seen as one of the new nation’s greatest Westernization efforts. The women in
this study would have finished or nearly finished lower education by 1956, but it would be
interesting to see if there is a connection between the greater involvement of women in the public
sphere and language choice.
Now that the gender of the subjects has been established, this paper will outline the other
criteria. All of the women featured are Tunisian and of the same generation. They were born in
Tunisia in the late 1930s or 1940s and are now of retirement age. This is an appropriate age
group for this study because the women lived under both the French protectorate and the
Tunisian republic and may reflect the changes (or lack thereof) that came with political change.
Furthermore, their age implies that they have had the opportunity to settle into their language
habits. Interviewing young women in secondary school or in early professional life could create
less stable results because they would, perhaps, still be experimenting linguistically and be less
sure about their political identities. The generation of women in this study will probably not be
very useful to hypothesize about the future code-switching situation in Tunisia. Studying them
will be useful to examine how language and identity connect and the role that major political
shifts can play in this connection.
Another aspect the women share is a high level of education. The high level of education
(at least through university) makes it more likely that the women have been exposed to both
French and Arabic. While these women were in primary and secondary school the system was
French; Arabization of the lower grades is a recent development. Furthermore, French would
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have been the language of education at the university level. The high level of education also
implies that the women have been exposed to a wide variety of worldviews. This criterion is
important to the study because, again, the thesis is based on the assumption that these women
make a choice between languages. The level of education makes this assumption plausible
because the more languages and worldviews they were exposed to, the more likely it is that their
code-switching indicates a conscious perception of self-identity.
The final criterion is location. All of the women studied had to live in the urbanized
suburban areas around Tunis. By happenstance, all of the women included live in La Marsa. As
mentioned in the previous section, the areas of the greatest French influence were the urban areas
along the coast. This location thus presents an interesting bubble in which French and Arabic
interact on a more comparable scale than if, for instance, this study were conducted in the South,
where Arabic might be more dominant. While some of the women may have been born outside
the Tunis area, they have lived here for significant amounts of time. The relatively equal
occurrences of the languages are needed to create an environment in which code-switching is
present and common.
As a final note about criteria, I would like to highlight the constraints of this study.
Ideally this research would have involved at least 50 women in order to get a representative
sample. However, given the time constraints the focus has become more limited. While this is
not ideal, this study still holds value. Although the population studied is small, the women in
question embody many of the ideologies that characterized Tunisia since the French protectorate
and the events of 1956 including bilingualism, and emphasis on education and openness to the
outside world. These traits make them compelling case studies for the connections between codeswitching and identity.
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The main focus of the interviews and observations include a 69-year-old retired professor
of social sciences named Khedija. Her family originates from Sousse and she has spent many
decades in the cities of Bizerte and La Marsa. Khedija fits all of the criteria of the research
subjects including the aforementioned geographic location, a high level of education, and
extensive exposure to both French and Arabic. Another central focus is Emna, an international
translator (Arabic, French and English) also in her 60’s. Emna grew up in the Tunisian suburb of
Le Bardo, and her family originates from Sfax. Finally, the study includes a couple of
supplementary statements from Khedija’s 62-year-old acquaintance, Rawda. Like her friend,
Rawda is a professor (of Arabic) and also lives in the Tunis suburban area. All three women have
spent extensive time abroad.

Questionnaire
There are three parts to the field work: observations, follow-up interviews, and background
questions. The observations involved observing the interactions between the women. I sat in on
their meetings and followed their conversations. These meetings were diverse in character,
ranging from afternoon teas, early morning walks, and friendly visits. I explicitly told the women
to act as if I was not there so that my presence did not influence their language choices. I took
note of what was discussed in French, and later asked the women to clarify what was discussed
in Arabic. After making these observations I proceeded to ask follow-up questions about the
conversations. The point of these questions was to test the theories about making a conscious
choice to speak about certain things in a certain language. Furthermore, the follow-up interviews
were meant to ascertain to what extent the women noticed they were code-switching. The
questions asked were as follows:
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1. What did you discuss in French and what did you discuss in Arabic?
a. Did you think about the switch between languages, or did it happen
automatically?
i. If you did make a deliberate decision, what was your reason?
2. Did you notice when your friend(s) code-switched?
a. If yes, did this influence what language you continued to use?
3. Do you have the linguistic capacity to discuss these subjects equally in both languages or
does one language lend a more specialized vocabulary than the other?
4. Would your language choices have been different if you had not known (and known the
language skills/habits of) the women with whom you spoke?

The other questions in this study are categorized as background questions. These questions
intended to give insight into the influences that have shaped how the women use French and
Arabic. The questions included inquiries about their upbringings, their education and daily lives.
They also included more reflective questions, which were used to uncover how they perceived
their identities in Tunisia. These questions were more sensitive in nature and care was taken to
make them neutral and revealing, but not prying. The questions were designed as follows:

5. What was your mother tongue, i.e. what language did you speak in your home as a child?
6. Did other family members speak both French and Arabic?
a. If yes, did this also encourage you to code-switch?
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b. If no, did code-switching ever cause you to feel distanced from your family? Did
you develop certain speaking habits at home that were different from those you
followed outside the home?
7. What language did you speak most with friends/classmates/peers?
a. Do you think that language, specifically one’s ability to code-switch between
French and Arabic, influenced what company you kept?
8. Do you see the French language as being a relic of France and colonialism, or more
simply as one of the languages of Tunisia?
9. Do you think that your generation is particularly likely to switch between Arabic and
French? Why?
10. Do you see speaking French as a necessity for success in Tunisia?
a. Why or why not?
b. If you did not have the ability to code-switch, do you think you would be hindered
professionally?
11. How are code-switchers viewed by others (who do not code-switch) in society?
a. Are they seen as more worldly? More Western and less Arab?
12. Do you see any conflict with identifying as a Tunisian or as an Arab and predominantly
speaking French?

IV. Observations
The follow-up interviews were conducted after observing specific conversations, while
the background questions were asked only once. The methodology varied from the hypothetical
framework in two minor respects. First, instead of interviewing the subject question by question,

18

the interviews were conducted in a more conversational manner that, nonetheless, covered all
desired subject areas. Second, it was the intention to do an in-depth analysis of several observed
conversations. As the interview answers will demonstrate, this process did not prove as prolific
as originally predicted.

Conversation observations
The impulse to scrutinize conversations was a result of my sojourn in Tunisia. Spending
time with my host mother and her acquaintances first introduced me to the pervasiveness in
everyday life of code-switching between French and Arabic. The ways in which conversations
appeared to transition fluidly in and out of the two languages was an intriguing area of study and
an inescapable aspect of Tunisian society. I began my research by writing down observations of
interactions between my host mother and her friends. These observations focused on four main
events: a tea gathering in October at Rawda’s house, a morning walk in early November with
Khedija and Rawda, a late November dinner party at Khedija’s house and a December gettogether between Emna and Khedija. The choice of these interactions was random, except for the
fact that they involved the women chosen as subjects and thus precipitated situations in which
code-switching would be present. My strategy when observing these interactions was to take
note of the language trends in the conversations and clarify what subjects were discussed
afterwards, as based on the questions outlined earlier. Interestingly, my observations of language
use were the same for all of the interactions. Greetings were almost always expressed in Arabic.
In all cases it appeared as if more Arabic was used then French, although occasional statements
were made entirely in French. More often than not, however, it appeared as if the matrix
language was Arabic and the embedded language was French; French words were present, but
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mixed into predominantly Arabic sentences. Regarding subject matter the results were not as
clear-cut as anticipated. The most French was used in what could be described as less personal
topics, like the 2008 United States presidential election, which was a popular topic at all of the
discussions. A sustained conversation in French was rare. I remarked upon the many uses of the
Tunisian dialect words for “when” and “where,” along with names mixed in with words referring
to family status like “sister” and “brother.” I was capable of following the French parts of the
conversations but because my grasp of the Arabic was limited beyond a few words and phrases, I
attempted to clarify what subjects were discussed. This attempt at clarification was unproductive
because the speakers could not remember the subjects that were discussed in French and the
subjects that were discussed in Arabic. Thus, although the post-conversation interviews were
asked, they did not provide satisfactory information.

Interviews
Given that observing the conversations did not yield an abundance of information, the
background interviews with the women proved to be even more imperative to this study. In
practice the questions framed in section II were not asked systematically as they were outlined.
Instead, the interviews took on more conversational tones but all of the inquiries behind the
questions were nonetheless addressed. Subsequently, the responses below are categorized by
general subject matter rather than specific question.

A. Personal linguistic history
Despite the many parallels between their situations, Khedija and Emna recounted slight
differences regarding their personal histories with language. Khedija spoke of her multilingual
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upbringing and the consequences of going to a French school in response to an inquiry about
whether she thinks knowing both French and Arabic is necessary for professional success in
Tunisia:
I have always spoken French, so I do not know. I read in French, my neighbors spoke
French. I am good in French and my Arabic is very poor. But I belong to the older
generation and for us Arabic was not very important. I learned [Classical] Arabic in
secondary school before I started learning English. I spoke a mixture at home. My
grandmother did not speak French, only Arabic. My mother spoke and wrote French and
Arabic. 47
Although she grew up in the same generation and in a similar location, Emna recounted a
different narrative than that of Khedija:
I learned the languages at the same time. We went to school at the age of six, and from
the age of six at school we learned both [Classical] Arabic and French. I learned to
speak Arabic at home and not French. We did not speak French at home. My mother did
not know any French… My family belongs to a circle that speaks Arabic only. They did
not mix Arabic and French… [But] this did not create any kind of estrangement. [My
speaking French] was alright with my parents, they did not feel like we were getting
away from their culture. But it is a question of generation and the type of family you
belong to. It is also a question of what school you went to. I went to a school that taught
in both, which was more than other people in my generation who spoke mostly in
French. 48
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Khedija. Personal interview. 30 November, 2008.
Emna. Personal interview. 2 December, 2008
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Rawda also recounted her language experiences, although she gave more general
impressions about the situation in Tunisia rather than her personal history: “True bilingualism
can only be when one speaks two languages from birth. Tunisians like me grow up speaking both
languages equally and mix them together.” 49 Rawda added that these circumstances allow
Tunisians to switch fluidly in and out of a language without realizing they are switching. In fact,
Rawda made these comments during the morning walk in November on which I accompanied
Khedija and Rawda. Khedija had pointed out to Rawda that they had switched from speaking in
a mixture of French and Arabic to mostly Arabic and (despite my protests) she suggested that
they make an effort to speak solely in French so that I could understand.

B. Perceived connotations of speaking French
In addition to knowing the background circumstances that have shaped the respondents’
relationships with code-switching, it was integral to this research to know how the subjects view
the French language. In particular, the questions aimed to ascertain the extent to which the
subjects feel French is an intrinsic part of their identities as Tunisian or if it runs counter to this
identity. Khedija explained her views about the association between French and colonization in
the following manner:
It is the marks of colonization. French has remained in the country after colonization
ended. It is taught in our schools before English, even though English has increased in
popularity and is gradually gaining. The French are not happy about that… [However],
it is not linked in our minds to colonization…We are aware in this country of the
importance of learning languages. Our government is giving much importance to other
languages. Maybe the fact that we are learning other languages gives less significance to
49

Rawda. Personal interview. 25 November, 2008
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French. French will become a language like any of the other languages that are taught.
We understand the significance of languages. Even though French is the language of our
colonizers, it is still a beautiful language and it is a language we appreciate. 50
I pressed Khedija further to find out if French has any other associations, including modernity or
education. In response she shared an anecdote with me:
Is [French] associated with modernity? I do not think so. But there is something true in
what you said. A Palestinian colleague of mine married to a Tunisian was here in the
early 1970s. When she went shopping she would speak Arabic, and she said the
shopkeepers at the market would answer in French. She said ‘I would tell them that I did
not understand French, and when I said that they would look down on me.’ There was
this idea that if you did not speak French you were illiterate. This is no longer the case
today. I do not think that anybody considers anybody who speaks Arabic only to be
illiterate. 51
Emna’s response also expressed a disconnect between the French language and the political and
cultural history of the French in Tunisia:
I do not really associate French with colonization. I associate it with school and
education. It is a question of generation. In my generation we used French a lot because
our schools were French schools. Younger generations use Arabic more than French,
unlike us. If I did [associate French with colonization], I would stop speaking so much
French because I do not like that idea. There are things I try to reduce on that basis, for
example when I think I watch too much French television or I get too involved in thinking
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about French politics, because I think it should not be important to me. But I do not think
this about the language. 52
Several days after this interview, Emna contacted me to tell me that she had reflected more on
the connotations of speaking French. While she maintained that there are not colonial
connotations to speaking French, she expressed that there is a social class component upon
which she wished to remark. Emna related to me a trip to the police station she made to make an
inquiry about her identity card. She emphasized to me how she had made a conscious effort to
speak to the officers in Arabic. She then told me about another Tunisian woman of a similar age
who came to the bureau while she was there, and who spoke entirely in French with the officers.
Emna said that even though the officers understood the French, she found the woman’s actions
snobbish and rude. According to Emna there was no reason for the woman to speak entirely in
French to the officers except to express her social standing. 53 She said that the association
between class and language is especially significant for people in her generation.

C. Cognizance of language habits
The last area addressed in these interviews was the speakers’ awareness of changing
between languages. A lack of awareness had already been established by the interviews
following the conversations but I decided to probe this point further with more generalized
questions. I pressed the respondents harder to think about their language habits and to try to
describe to me what goes through their minds when they are speaking, especially whether they
correlate certain languages with certain subjects of discussion. Khedija explained her thoughts as
follows:
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Emna. Personal interview. 2 December, 2008.
Emna. Personal interview. 8 December, 2008.
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I do not think I have a certain language for certain topics. I would say, though, there are
recurrent words that are so popular…for the younger generation it is ‘mushnormale,’ a
French word, and it has somehow been adopted. You have other words that belong to the
background. There is no effort, the words come by themselves… [I discuss] politics more
in French than in Arabic, but Arabic could still be used. Maybe this is because I watch
French news, read French newspapers. But even those who are very good in Arabic will
tend to use French to talk about politics. I use Arabic maybe with housework, with
shopping, going to the market. There we use the Arabic words for vegetables, fruit and
meat. 54
Emna’s responses were in a similar vein:
I speak more in Arabic for the things in daily life and in the family, such as ‘I am going to
Tunis today.’ If I discuss the family, or the subjects that concern family, I discuss more in
Arabic. If I have a discussion more systematic, I speak in French. It depends a lot on who
I am speaking with. I do not have the same way of speaking, for example, with someone
who is more arabphone and someone who is more francophone. It is not just me who
chooses, it is with whom I am speaking. 55
Both women also tried to articulate whether they notice their code-switching habits. I detected
that it seemed difficult for both of them to describe their habits, and they indicated that this was a
question they rarely consider. Khedija described her thoughts:
Sometimes I do not find the word in Arabic. I notice that I am switching to French
because I cannot find the word in Arabic. If someone speaks in Arabic, I will speak in
Arabic, same with French. It is when I realize I am talking to someone that does not
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speak French that I make an effort to not use any French words. That happens when I am
talking with other people from the rest of the Arab world. For example when I am talking
with Jordanians I will not use French, they do not understand French. 56
Emna also expressed a frustration resulting from searching for words in Arabic:
When I discuss with my friends, I do not perceive when I am changing. However, when I
hear someone who I do not know, or the radio, I immediately notice. It bothers me, it is
not attractive to change between the languages, although I do it…It is true that when I
switch to some subjects I find it difficult to speak Arabic all the time. I have to think about
how to say some words in Arabic. This is for sophisticated things, if I am reasoning about
problems or politics. But if I am making plans with my sisters, I can say everything in
Arabic.
The responses provided above will provide the basis of this paper’s analysis. They will be
used to test to what extent the theoretical association between language and identity may be
present in Tunisia, particularly among women of the subjects’ generation.

V. Analysis
This paper was built around the hypothesis that code-switching between French and
Arabic is a phenomenon that affects the identity of the individual code-switcher. The political
history of language in Tunisia under the French protectorate and the policies of Arabization
underlie this proposition. Through the interviews one can see that while there may be a
hyperconsciousness about language, the speakers do not necessarily tie it to issues of identity. In
fact, one of the hindrances of the interviewing process was that the speakers found it difficult to
explain their code-switching choices. As the forthcoming analysis of the responses will
56
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demonstrate, however, the responses given by the interviewees do still provide insight into the
extent to which language and identity are connected in Tunisia.

The influences of language planning
Language planning, as discussed in section II, includes decisions made by the
government about what languages will be used in what capacities in the country. In this situation
languages are relegated to certain spheres depending on their perceived importance in shaping
national identity. When the French established their Tunisian protectorate in 1881, they followed
this line of thought and defined public spheres like government and education as French spaces
and limited Arabic to religion and the home. Although the governments post-independence have
taken some steps to arabize Tunisia – by declaring Arabic the official language, and by making
Arabic a more extensive medium of education – French still remains a language of the public
sphere, including commerce, science and media. The three women I interviewed serve as
interesting illustrations of the effects that language planning in the mid-20th century had on the
Tunisian population. Their school and family histories, in particular, emphasize this point.
Khedija went to a monolingual French school and spoke a mixture of French and Arabic at
home. The use of French as the sole method of education could lead the student to identify
French as the language associated with learning and knowledge advancement. Alternately, the
lack of Arabic outside the home might have influenced her use of the language; even today she
uses Arabic primarily in relation to household matters. It is intriguing to contrast Khedija’s
personal history with that of Emna. Unlike Khedija, Emna was educated in both French and
(Classical) Arabic. She spoke only Arabic at home. Despite their different language
conditionings, Emna, like Khedija, associates Arabic with the private sphere and French with the
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public sphere. This phenomenon exists despite the fact that Emna was introduced to Arabic as a
language of knowledge parallel to French.
The fact that both Khedija and Emna associate Arabic with the more mundane, everyday
subjects is perhaps indicative of a perception of French as a more sophisticated language. I found
notable Khedija’s comment that even people who know Arabic very well tend to discuss politics
in French. If this is true, it would imply that the superiority the French claimed through the
equation of language with culture has to some extent been internalized in these women. Their
habits, furthermore, indicate the way in which language planning can leave lasting impressions
on a country’s citizens. The women observed and interviewed for this paper came of age in a
time of transition in Tunisia. They attended primary school under French rule, and higher
education in the newly independent republic. The efforts of the state to establish its independent
identity are evident in the initially proposed Arabization policies. One can see the struggle with
the lasting influences of the protectorate in the way that French maintained an important role in
public life, despite its demotion to an interim language and the elevation of Arabic to official
status. To some extent, perhaps, the struggles of the state to define its identity influenced the
generation of Khedija and Emna and are exemplified in their code-switching habits. The elevated
status of French during their school years ensured that this language would play a large role in
their speaking habits. And, yet, the resistance to the French under the protectorate and the
support for an Arab identity under Arabization may have contributed to the continued use of
Arabic among Tunisians in the home. It is important to reiterate here that the resistance and calls
for Arabization were not as strong in Tunisia as in Algeria, a country more infiltrated by the
French because of its status as an official colony. Perhaps this lack of resistance is what allowed
the two languages to, apparently amicably, retreat to separate social spheres. Emna supported
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this idea with her assertion that although her family only spoke Arabic, she encountered no
discouraging sentiments or feelings of estrangement when she learned French. Much like the
situation under the protectorate, the interview responses indicate that for that generation of
women French is irreversibly associated with public and official life while Arabic is associated
with private and family life. The comments of the women indicate that this is not a contentious
split. Instead, they are much like the state itself as it struggled between two ideational extremes
and settled on middle ground. Like the state itself, there appears to be a desire to be at once
francophone and Arab.

Associations of French and France
Perhaps one of the reasons that the middle ground of code-switching between French and
Arabic is not very contentious for women like Khedija and Emna is that they make very little
association between the French language and the French. The French may have used language as
a weapon of subjugation in the imperial era, but these women do not make that association when
they code-switch. This finding was particularly surprising, given that the thesis of this paper was
premised on the assumption that French is a politically and emotionally charged language in a
postcolonial state like Tunisia. Based on the responses, one cannot attribute this lack of
association simply to a lack of thinking about the historical role of the language. Indeed, Emna
pointed out clearly that she considers the legacy of the French when she contemplates her
attachment to French media and she desires to limit that attachment. The women attribute their
command of French to their education. While one can trace the style of education they received
directly to the French and the ideologies that they brought with them to Tunisia, the interview
responses did not emphasize this connection. Khedija, indeed, offered another explanation. She

29

expressed her belief that Tunisia and its government stress the importance of multilingualism.
She implied that if it had not been French, it would have been another language in its place.
Moreover, Rawda also conveys that the bilingualism is an inherent aspect of Tunisia with her
comment about bilingualism beginning at birth.
This analysis cannot consider these responses anything but valid because they represent
the views of the contributors. The responses, though, do raise several theoretical questions about
the association of the French language with the historical role of the French in Tunisia. Language
may have been de-territorialized as a result of colonization, but that is not to say that language
and ideology were separated. Emna attributes her language situation to her education. Khedija
attributes her penchant to speak about politics in French to the fact that she prefers to read
French media. However, it must be asked: what are the factors that lead to these sources of
influence? Why was education in the mid-20th century dominated by French? Why has French
media historically been more popular than Arabic media? Theoretically one can trace these
circumstances to the connection of language and identity. One would say, in theory, that the
perception of French as a superior language, and thus culture, was propagated to the point that
the identity that came with the language was internalized into Tunisian society. The responses to
the interview questions complicate matters of field work because they highlight the way in which
habits like code-switching between French and Arabic become so ingrained that the speakers
cease to see the former language as a characteristic of the “other.” These findings challenge the
thesis of this paper. The responses cast doubt on one’s ability to apply theory to reality, because
theory, in this case, does not take into account that habits might become so deeply rooted that the
people no longer associate them with choices.
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Code-switching and group dynamics
The responses given to the questions about associating French with certain ideologies and
the ways in which the respondents were perplexed when they tried to explain their codeswitching habits, indicates that code-switching among this generation of Tunisian women is
decidedly less political than was expected. Both Emna and Khedija conveyed that they do not see
speaking French in addition to Arabic as preventative to identifying as Tunisian. The two
women, in addition to Rawda, spoke of the bilingual language habits in terms of “we” and “us,”
indicating that they do not see code-switching as a divide among Tunisians but as a distinctive
characteristic of the population. When reviewing these results one should keep in mind the
political history of language in Tunisia. These responses come from women who were influenced
by the French education systems and now speak French as a primary language. The historically
superior status of French in Tunisia may influence the sentiments of inclusiveness in the
responses. That is to say, if the respondents had not been products of the French education
system of their generation, and if they instead used Arabic more than French, it is possible they
would have given different responses. Being able to code-switch easily between the languages of
public and private life, and indeed to be more proficient in the language of social mobility, might
put them in a position where language does not carry as much political or ideological
significance. Emna’s anecdote about the police station lends validity to this idea. Although
speaking Arabic or speaking French was not a matter of practicality because the police officers
understood both, it was a matter of relating with one another on an equal, respectful level. It
exemplifies that while the linkage of French to ideas of linguistic superiority may not continue, it
is still linked to issues of social class and power. Indeed, both women indicated that their
language habits, when talking to people who are not of similar social, economic or educational
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backgrounds, depend not on their own prerogatives but those of the others. This position appears
to be one of privilege, but their actions also indicate a lack of desire to use language as a divisive
factor between them and their fellow Tunisians.
It should not be forgotten that even though the women profiled here did not see strong,
direct links between French and identity, they did communicate the frustration that theoretically
accompanies code-switching when the languages are politicized. The women spoke of their
inabilities to talk in depth about subjects like politics in Arabic. They lamented the fact that,
outside of basic household conversations, they often found themselves searching for the Arabic
words and steering the conversation back into French. Despite their use of inclusive language
when talking about the bilingual nature of Tunisia, the inability to communicate about some
subjects with monolingual Arabic-speaking Tunisians seems to cause a frustrating divide. The
fact that these subjects of frustration include politics might over time lead to divided identities
within Tunisia simply because of the lack of communication about the subject that might occur
between a generation that speaks primarily in French and younger generations in which more
people favor Arabic. Arabization might not have as tight a hold in Tunisia as elsewhere in the
Maghreb, but Arabic is nonetheless gaining in status, as proven by its increased use in schools. It
is unlikely that one would now be looked down upon, like the woman in Khedija’s anecdote, for
speaking in Arabic at the market. The political leaders controlling language planning may for
now be predominantly French-educated, but it is probable that in the future this will change. As
the language of politics and the language planning policies change, it will be interesting to see
what divisions might erupt between the French-speaking generations and the Arabic-speaking
factions in Tunisia. Will Arabic-French code-switching become even more widespread, or will
other languages become involved? Or, will a more monolingual phenomenon arise? According
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to the women interviewed, code-switching is not motivated by politics but as the linguistic
landscape changes this might not always be the case. Perhaps there is some significance in the
fact that the women interviewed associate primarily with women who follow similar language
habits. The code-switching among friends was fluid and unaware, while the women said that
with strangers or people with language habits known to be different from their own they must be
more hyperconscious about how they speak. The linguistic dynamics of Tunisia appear to
encourage group divisions because of the many frustrations that come with efforts to
accommodate various language habits. These sentiments show that the code-switching is not
ubiquitous throughout the Tunisian population and indicates the possibility for more political
connotations in the future.
While the interview responses give insight into Tunisian language dynamics, the
women’s statements also provide insight into the linguistic interaction between Tunisia and the
rest of the Arab world. All three of the women suggested that the phenomenon of code-switching
between French and Arabic is a distinguishing aspect of Tunisia. The women also articulated the
increased attention they must pay to how they speak when they are speaking with someone from
the Mashreq versus the Maghreb. One should not ignore the differences between Arabic dialects
to which these women must pay attention, but what is of greater significance for this study is the
attention they must pay to the francophone-arabphone divide. Khedija’s story about the
Palestinian woman in Tunisia is particularly illuminating because it shows the strong place of
French in Tunisian society as well as how it can be a divisive factor between Tunisia and other
Arab countries. The policies of Arabization were intended to culturally and politically unite Arab
countries. The failure of these policies in Tunisia may have marked a turning point at which
Tunisia began to emphasize a more independent identity. Thus, although the women do not
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associate speaking French with a pro-France perspective, it seems that they do see it as a factor
that separates them from other Arab countries. The frustration the women have speaking solely
in Arabic with Tunisians would only be augmented on the regional scale. In this context,
perhaps, code-switching would take on a more political character than it has in Tunisia because
historical, cultural, and political differences would be emphasized by the use of French.
However, the effort that the women say they make when talking non-Tunisian Arabs, like they
do with arabphone Tunisians, indicates a desire to project an inclusive image. They could choose
to continue speaking as they do among one another, in a mixture of French and Arabic, and make
a clear separation between them and other Arab people but they do not. While the women may
not think politically or ideologically about their language choices in conversations with other
Tunisian code-switchers, they may be more conscious of the implications of language in other
contexts. One can even make comparisons between the domains of code-switching on national
and regional levels. In Tunisia, and especially among the generation interviewed, French is the
means of communication in the public sphere and Arabic belongs to the private sphere.
Alternately, when interacting with Arabs from other countries, Tunisians like those interviewed
must use Arabic at both the public and the private levels.

VI. Conclusions
Tunisia may have declared independence from France in 1956 but the formal separation
does not carry over to linguistic reality. For Tunisians like the women in this study who grew up
in the mid-20th century, bilingualism and the mélange of French and Arabic is a certainty of
everyday life. 57 The comments of Khedija, Emna and Rawda offer insight into the reasoning
behind language habits. Furthermore, their remarks allow a comparison between theory and
57
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reality that highlights the weaknesses of the theory that one can equate language and identity.
The thesis of this paper expected to find that the women code-switch due to a conscious
association between language and identity. Instead, this paper found that the speakers at question
code-switch chiefly in an unconscious manner. While they attributed their habits to the
circumstances of their upbringings, they did not associate French or Arabic with separate
identities. For them, the coexistence of the languages is a defining characteristic of Tunisia. They
did, however, indicate considerations of class. The women’s comments offered the chance to
speculate about the political circumstances behind language planning and to probe deeper into
possible influences on uses of language that they might not have pinpointed.
Even though the thesis was not proven, the women interviewed facilitated an intriguing
study of the language situation in Tunisia. This project demonstrates the complexities of identity
and language in a postcolonial society like Tunisia that cannot be explained with a single theory,
and it encourages further research in a variety of avenues. One of the limitations of this research
was the narrow scope of observations. While observing the conversations between friends
revealed one aspect of code-switching, it would be interesting to observe these habits in a variety
of situations, such as in the professional realm and in the classroom. The women gave anecdotes
about other situations, but first-hand observations would help circumvent any bias that might
have been present. While the women described how they changed their language habits when
speaking with non-Tunisian Arabs, observing these conversations could yield greater
information about the constraints and frustrations the women face. It would also be useful to
expand the socioeconomic qualifications of the research subjects. Tunisian women from different
economic classes and geographic locations would most likely add more facets to the issue of
code-switching in Tunisia. As mentioned earlier, the primarily French-speaking women profiled
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here do not make strong associations between language and identity but this may not be the case
for primarily Arabic-speaking women or women who grew up away from areas of great French
influence. Additionally, a study of the code-switching habits of men would enable an
investigation of whether the habits are gendered. This would be especially intriguing considering
the emphasis placed postindependence on the greater public role of women. To finish, while the
generation of women in this study is useful to examine the effects of imperialism on a society,
the study of younger generations would provide an intriguing comparison. How do young people
today view French and Arabic code-switching? Many of their parents and grandparents may
have gone to French schools like the women mentioned here, but does this affect their habits? It
is not possible to ignore the increasing presence of English as a code-switching language.
Rawda, in fact, insisted: “Be sure to include that I am now English speaking too!” 58 Is it possible
that, as Khedija said, languages have a revered place in Tunisian society and English could take
the place of French and become the new hallmark of bilingualism? Comparing and contrasting
the politics of language in the era of colonialism and the era of globalization would strengthen
the conclusions for both areas of study. Given the unique geographical, political, cultural and
linguistic histories of Tunisia, the country undoubtedly has the potential to host many future
studies about language and identity.
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